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ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND MODERN
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
SAUL CORNELL*
In his View of the Constitution of the United States, St. George
Tucker described the Second Amendment as "the true palladium of
liberty."' Supporters of gun rights have argued that Tucker's
comments provide irrefutable proof that the right to bear arms was
originally understood to protect an individual right to keep and
use firearms for personal self-defense, hunting, and any other
lawful activity.2 This claim rests on a serious misreading of
Tucker's constitutional writings. Tucker was a product of an
* Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University; Director, Second Amendment
Research Center, John Glenn Institute. I would like to thank Dave Douglas, the organizer
of this conference, and the other participants at the St. George Tucker Conference, Paul
Carrington, Charles Cullen, Michael Curtis, Paul Finkelman, Charles Hobson, Craig Evan
Klafter, David Konig, Kurt Lash, Mark McGarvie, and William Nelson, who offered
thoughtful suggestions. In addition, I would like to thank the special collections staff at the
Earl Gregg Swem Library for making the Tucker-Coleman Collection available to conference
participants during the library's renovations.
1. St. George Tucker, Irew of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 ST. GEORGE
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA ed. app. at 300 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803) [hereinafter
Tucker, View of the Constitution].
2. As gun rights advocate David Kopel notes, "St. George Tucker appears regularly in
Standard Model articles discussing the Second Amendment. It is perhaps significant that
none of the anti-individual writers even admit Tucker's existence, let alone attempt to address
the meaning of the most important law book of the Early Republic." David B. Kopel, The
Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1378 (footnote
omitted). See also Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on
Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237 (2004) (book review) (claiming that an
excerpt from Tucker's published work supports an individual-rights interpretation). For
invocations of Tucker in popular gun rights culture, see Robert Dowlut, Commentary, The
Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV.
65, 83-84 (1983), David Hardy, St. George Tucker on the Second Amendment (1997), http://
www.womenshooters.com/wfn/tucker.html, and Our 2nd Amendment: The Original
Perspective, AM. GUARDIAN, July 1998, available at http://www.nraila.orgfIssueslArticles/
Read.aspx?ID=21.
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eighteenth-century world quite alien to our own, and his view of the
Second Amendment was a product of the struggles of his own day,
not the modern debate between gun rights and gun control. The
individual rights misreading of Tucker is merely the latest example
of how constitutional scholarship has been hijacked for ideological
purposes in this bitter debate.3 To understand what Tucker meant
by the phrase "the true palladium of liberty," one must pay careful
attention to the political context in which he wrote and the role that
the right to bear arms played in his constitutional theory. While
partisans of the individual rights theory have misinterpreted
Tucker's understanding of the Second Amendment, they are
certainly correct to insist that Tucker's views of the Second Amend-
ment are important and merit close attention.4 Tucker was one of
the leading legal thinkers of the Founding Era, and his magisterial
study of Blackstone's Commentaries was an influential work of
constitutional theory that helped shape the terms of constitutional
discourse in the early republic.5 For originalists, Tucker's Blackstone
3. The use and abuse of history in recent Second Amendment jurisprudence and
scholarship has been well documented by a number of scholars. See Saul Cornell, "Don't Know
Much About History'" The Current Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV.
657 (2002) (exposing "some of the historical errors that have ... come to be regarded as
historical truth"); Paul Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia" The Second Amendment in
Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (2000); Jack N. Rakove, The Second
Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 103 (2000). Even among
historians sympathetic to the individual-rights view, there has been criticism of much recent
legal scholarship adopting this point of view. See Robert E. Shalhope, To Keep and Bear Arms
in the Early Republic, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 269, 270 (1999) ("In their urgency to propound
a particular view of the Amendment that fits their current ideological demands, jurists have
either ignored the political culture of the early republic or framed it in such a way as to suit
their needs."). As the case of historian Michael Bellesiles demonstrates, violations of accepted
standards of scholarly practice are not unique to legal scholarship or the individual rights
model, but have also plagued the collective rights interpretation. See James Lindgren, Fall
from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195 (2002) (book
review) (claiming that the Bellesiles Scandal "is changing the way that some historians think
about their own profession and how some scholars allied to history regard historical research
and publishing"); Danny Postel, Did the Shootouts over 'Arming America' Divert Attention
from the Real Issues?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1, 2002, at A12. For a
balanced assessment of the current state of the debate, see Stuart Banner, The Second
Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. REV. 898,903-05 (2004) (reviewing DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE
MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003)).
4. See Kopel, supra note 2, at 1378.
5. See BERNARD ScHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 161 (1993).
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is particularly important because it drew heavily on the learned
jurist's own William and Mary law lectures, which were composed
almost contemporaneously with the framing and adoption of the
Second Amendment.' While originalists are correct to note that
Tucker's law lectures provide the first systematic effort to describe
the meaning of the Second Amendment and its role in American
constitutionalism, Tucker's earliest commentary on the Second
Amendment does not support the individual rights view. Indeed, in
his unpublished law lectures Tucker not only explicitly described
the Second Amendment as a right of the states, but he noted that its
inclusion in the Constitution was designed to assuage Anti-Federal-
ists' fears about the Constitution's power over the militia discussed
in Article I, Section 8.' To underscore the Second Amendment's role
as a guardian of states' rights within the federal system, Tucker
also linked its function with the Tenth Amendment, the provision
of the Bill of Rights most closely associated with federalism.8
Tucker's earliest writings about the Second Amendment challenge
the often-repeated claim that the states' rights theory of the Second
Amendment is a modern invention quite alien to the Founding Era.9
Tucker's analysis of the Second Amendment in the unpublished
law lectures also sheds new light on his discussion of "the true
palladium of liberty" more than a decade later. 10 When Tucker's
early thoughts about the Second Amendment are set against his
later published writing on the same topic, it is possible to see how
this issue fits into the structure of his more mature constitutional
theory. Tucker's understanding of the role of the right to bear arms
in American constitutionalism evolved over the course of the 1790s,
6. See Rakove, supra note 3, at 106-07 (discussing the particular importance of the
Framers' intent in Second Amendment interpretation).
7. St. George Tucker, Ten Notebooks of William and Mary Law Lectures 126-29
[hereinafter Tucker, Law Lectures] (unpublished Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl
Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary).
8. See id.
9. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 244 & n.171 (1983); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461, 493-94 (1995); Joyce Lee Malcolm,
Infringement, COMMON-PLACE, July 2002, available at http://www.common-place.orgvol-
02/no-04/roundtable/malcolm.shtml (implying that the states' rights interpretation developed
in response to political concerns in the early twentieth century).
10. See Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 7, at 127-28.
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and these changes reflected his attempt to adapt his theory to
the rapidly changing circumstances of American politics in the
Federalist Era." Tucker greatly expanded his discussion of the
meaning of the Second Amendment in his published treatise. 2 He
did not abandon his earlier commitment to states' rights, but he did
refine and enlarge his analysis of the structural role of the Second
Amendment in supporting federalism, giving additional attention
to the role of the Second Amendment as a civic right." According to
that notion, the right to bear arms in a well-regulated militia was
a judicially enforceable privilege and immunity of federal citizen-
ship.'4 Ironically, Tucker, a staunch defender of states' rights,
articulated a view of the Second Amendment that would be adopted
by the nationalist-minded Republicans in the Department of Justice
during Reconstruction. 5
Tucker's analysis of the right to bear arms was far more sophisti-
cated than modern Second Amendment theorists have recognized.
His writings fit neither the modern collective nor individual rights
models.' 6 In his more mature writings, Tucker thus approached the
right to bear arms as both a right of the states and as a civic right. 7
Tucker also dealt with the issue of individual self-defense, but he
did not treat this right in the context of his discussion of the
Second Amendment." Tucker located this right in common law, not
11. Compare Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 7, at 126-29, with Tucker, View of the
Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 272-75.
12. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 272-75.
13. See id. ed. app. at 272-75, 356-57.
14. See id. ed. app. at 356-57. On the notion of incorporating the Second Amendment as
a civic right, see Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 491-94 (2004). The article suggests that the
"civic rights model comes the closest to faithfully translating the dominant understanding of
the right to bear arms in the Founding Era." Id.
15. For a different view of the Second Amendment and incorporation, see AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 257-66 (1998). Amar claims that
"Reconstruction gun-toting was individualistic" rather than "collective." Id.; see also STEPHEN
P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS,
1866-1876, at viii (1998) (basing discussion of right of former slaves to bear arms on
conclusion that "the purpose of the Second Amendment was to protect individual rights").
16. See WHOSE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS DID THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECT? 17-21 (Saul
Cornell ed., 2000) (discussing the modern debate among Second Amendment scholars).
17. See Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 300, 356-57.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
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constitutional law.19 One cannot hope to understand Tucker's legal
theory without appreciating the different legal foundations for the
two rights. Modern discussions of gun rights and gun control have
generally ignored the common law, focusing instead on issues of
constitutional law.20 The obsession with constitutional law and the
absence of attention to common law would have been puzzling to
Tucker and others of the founding generation. The common law was
absolutely essential to understanding the right of self-defense and
a host of other issues in American law. 1 Indeed, the bulk of Tucker's
study of Blackstone was not devoted to the Federal Constitution
but to the common law.2 2 Disentangling these two concepts is not
only essential to understanding Tucker's legal theory, it provides
important insights into the origins of our current impasse on the
right to bear arms.
I. TUCKER'S ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Tucker himself noted that, had The Federalist treated the defects
of the Constitution with equal candor as its strengths, it would have
provided the best commentary on America's new frame of govern-
ment.2 Since The Federalist had not dealt honestly with those
defects and had been written before the amendments were adopted
subsequent to ratification, Tucker believed it was vital to provide
his students with a detailed guide to the new law of the land.24
Tucker's lectures were the first systematic effort by any figure in
American law to describe the contours of the new system created by
the amended Constitution.28
Tucker was a moderate Anti-Federalist who had initially opposed
ratification, but as Federalists scored one victory after another in
the individual state ratification conventions, he was forced to
19. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note 9.
21. For a discussion of Tucker's treatment of common law, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 5,
at 168-70.
22. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1.
23. See id. ed. app. at 376-77.
24. See id.
25. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 161.
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rethink his stance.26 He came to believe that, with proper amend-
ments, the Constitution could effectively protect both the rights of
the states and the liberty of individuals." Admittedly, Tucker was
not entirely pleased with the final shape of the Bill of Rights that
emerged from Congress, which had not sufficiently scaled back the
powers of the federal government.28 Still, in his law lectures he
expressed guarded optimism that America's new constitutional
system could weather any future storms on the horizon.29
Tucker's William and Mary law lectures defined the core around
which he built his monumental study of Blackstone's Commentaries
published in 1803.30 Although his unpublished discussion of the
Second Amendment in these lectures has not been discussed by
modern scholars, it provides a remarkable source for understanding
his earliest thinking about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 1
Tucker was well informed about congressional debates on the
Bill of Rights. His brother, Thomas Tudor Tucker, was a member of
Congress, and St. George corresponded with other leading politi-
cians of his day about political matters.3 2 While evidence of the
crucial Senate debates over the wording of the Second Amendment
have not survived, one tantalizing suggestion about the character
of this discussion is provided in a letter Virginian John Randolph
wrote to Tucker, declaring that "[a] majority of the Senate were for
not allowing the militia arms."3 Randolph happily reported that
26. See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING
TRADITION INAMERICA, 1788-1828, at 263-73 (1999).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 271-72.
29. See Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 7. For an analysis of Tucker's place in the legal
culture of revolutionary Virginia, see CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND THE LAW
IN VIRGINIA, 1772-1804 (1987) (published version of 1971 Ph.D. dissertation). On Tucker's
place in American legal thought, see CRAIG EVAN KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENT:
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 31-47 (1993); SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 159-71; G.
EDWARD WHITE, 3-4 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 81-86 (1988).
30. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 161.
31. CORNELL, supra note 26, at 263.
32. See, e.g., Letter from Theodorick Bland Randolph to St. George Tucker (Sept. 9, 1789),
in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 293 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
33. Letter from John Randolph to St. George Tucker (Sept. 11, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
32, at 293.
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this proposal failed to garner a two-thirds majority and was
defeated. 4 Randolph explained the significance of this decision as
a victory for those who opposed the designs of the Federalists."5
' They are," Randolph commented, "afraid that the Citizens will stop
their full Career to Tyranny & Oppression."" Randolph's letter
sheds light on the decision of the Senate to reject language that
would have linked the right to bear arms to the common defense.
While individual rights scholars have suggested that the Senate's
rejection of this language clearly establishes that they intended to
protect an individual right,37 Randolph's letter casts the choice to
excise this language in a radically different light.3" The issue was
not individual versus collective rights, as gun rights scholars have
claimed, but clearly was federal versus state control. If the right to
bear arms was restricted to common defense, that construction
would have been viewed by proponents of states' rights as a threat
to the militia. As Randolph's letter to Tucker suggests, the issue
before the Senate was control of the militia, not an individual right
to use guns for personal defense or hunting.3 9
The connection between the Second Amendment and federalism
emerges unambiguously in Tucker's law lectures. Tucker described
the meaning of the Second Amendment in the following terms:
If a State chooses to incur the expence of putting arms into the
Hands of its own Citizens for their defense, it would require no
small ingenuity to prove that they have no right to do it, or that
it could by any means contravene the Authority of the federal
Govt. It may be alledged indeed that this might be done for the
purpose of resisting the Laws of the federal Government, or of
shaking off the Union: to which the plainest Answer seems to be,
that whenever the States think proper to adopt either of these
measures, they will not be with-held by the fear of infringing any
of the powers of the federal Government. But to contend that
such a power would be dangerous for the reasons above-men-
tioned would be subversive of every principle of Freedom in our
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 3, at 121-22.
38. See Letter from John Randolph to St. George Tucker, supra note 33, at 293.
39. See id.
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Government; of which the first Congress appears to have been
sensible by proposing an Amendment to the Constitution, which
has since been ratified and has become a part of it, viz. 'That a
well regulated militia being necessary to the Security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep & bear arms shall not be
infringed." To this we may add that this power of arming the
militia, is not one of those prohibited to the States by the
Constitution, and, consequently, is reserved to them under the
twelfth Article of the ratified Aments."
In his earliest formulation of the meaning of the Second
Amendment, drafted shortly after its adoption, Tucker interpreted
the Amendment within the context of federalism. In his view, the
inclusion of a provision protecting the right to bear arms was a
necessary concession to moderate Anti-Federalists who feared that
the power of the federal government might threaten the states.41
Tucker even went so far as to argue that this right might include
the awesome power of either "resisting the Laws of the Federal
Government, or of shaking off the Union."42 To underscore the fact
that the Second Amendment had to be interpreted in terms of the
larger struggle over power relations in the federal system, Tucker
explicitly linked the Second Amendment to the Tenth Amendment,
another provision that dealt with federalism. 43 Rather than frame
the meaning of the Second Amendment in terms of a right of
personal self-defense, as many modern gun rights advocates have
argued, Tucker's discussion casts the right to bear arms as a right
of the states.
44
Tucker was hardly the only early constitutional commentator to
describe the Second Amendment as the "palladium of liberty," nor
was he the only one to locate the origins of the Amendment in
the struggle over the structure of federalism between Federalists
and Anti-Federalists. The archnationalist Joseph Story adopted
a similar point of view in his Commentaries on the Constitution,
40. Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 7, at 127-28. The Tenth Amendment was originally
the Twelfth Amendment proposed to the states. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 8-19 (discussing
the importance of the first two amendments that were not ratified).
41. Tucker, Law Lectures, supra note 7, at 126-29.
42. Id. at 127.
43. See id. at 127-28.
44. See id.
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another influential constitutional text written several decades
later.4 While individual rights scholars have often cited Story in
modern Second Amendment scholarship, they have studiously
avoided examining his own analysis of the original understanding
of the Second Amendment.46 Given that Story shared Tucker's view
that the Second Amendment had been adopted to assuage Anti-
Federalists' fears about the potential disarmament of the state
militias, this omission is not surprising.4 v In contrast to Tucker,
who sympathized with much of the Anti-Federalist critique of the
Constitution, Story viewed these fears as entirely unfounded."
Indeed, he confessed his own bewilderment over Anti-Federalists'
apprehensions about the potential threats to the state militias.49
It is difficult fully to comprehend the influence of such objec-
tions, urged with much apparent sincerity and earnestness at
such an eventful period. The answers then given seem to have
been, in their structure and reasoning, satisfactory and conclu-
sive. But the amendments proposed to the constitution (some of
which have been since adopted) show, that the objections were
extensively felt, and sedulously cherished. The power of Con-
gress over the militia (it was urged) was limited, and concurrent
with that of the statesW0
While Story and Tucker did not agree about the potential threat
posed by federal control of the militia, both scholars recognized that
originally the Second Amendment had been part of a compromise
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists designed to reaffirm state
control of the militia and neutralize the fear that the militia might
be disarmed.5
Tucker and Story each interpreted the original understanding of
the Second Amendment as a response to the argument between
45. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1890 (1833).
46. For efforts to enlist Story in the modern gun rights cause, see Kopel, supra note 2, at
1388-97, and Reynolds, supra note 9, at 470.
47. See 3 STORY, supra note 45, §§ 1200-1202.
48. See id. §§ 1202-1203.
49. See id.
50. Id. § 1202 (footnote omitted).
51. Compare 3 STORY, supra note 45, §§ 1199-1210, 1890-1891, with Tucker, Law
Lectures, supra note 7, at 126-29.
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Federalists and Anti-Federalists over federalism. Protection of
states' rights, not individual rights, was the issue that had
prompted the inclusion of the Second Amendment.5 3 Anti-
Federalists had repeatedly harped on these two dangers during
ratification.54 Federalists were forced to respond to this argument
and concede far more power to the states than they might have
been comfortable with at the start of ratification.55 Indeed, Anti-
Federalist criticism led James Madison to argue in Federalist No. 46
that even if the federal government chose to create a powerful
standing army, it would be no match for "a militia amounting to
near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by
men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common
liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their
affections and confidence."56 While it is hard to imagine Madison
articulating such a strong states' rights view in PhilAdelphia during
the framing of the Constitution, the persistent attacks by Anti-
Federalists during ratification had forced him to concede that in
extreme circumstances the state militias might act as the final
bulwark against federal tyranny.57
Ratification was a dynamic process in which the participants were
often forced to recast their positions as they encountered criticism
and challenges.58 Rather than seek a single static meaning for the
right to bear arms and the militia, it is important to recognize that
the meaning of the Constitution was evolving in the brief time
between the conclusion of the Philadelphia Convention and its final
52. See CORNELL, supra note 26, at 263-73; 3 STORY, supra note 45, §§ 1200-1202.
53. Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second
Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 39 (1998), reprinted in WHOSE RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS DID THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECT?, supra note 16, at 97-122.
54. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 220 (1995).
55. See generally id. at 265-90 (discussing Madison's views through the ratification
process).
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 334 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
57. See id. There is some debate over how nationalistic Madison was during the struggle
over the Constitution. See BANNING, supra note 54, at 265-90. Banning argues that the
common identification of Madison as "a leader of a nationalistic push ... comes quite close to
... standing [him] on his head." Id. at 20. For a more pragmatic view of Madison, see Jack N.
Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1988).
58. See Rakove, supra note 3, at 113-26 (discussing the politics surrounding ratification
and the evolution of the language of the Second Amendment during this process).
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adoption. In response to Anti-Federalist attacks, Federalists had
been forced to shift ground and offer some public assurances that
the state militias would never be disarmed.59 This was part of the
implicit bargain struck to ratify the Constitution. Anti-Federalists
failed to obtain their primary goal of securing structural amend-
ments to the Constitution that would have shifted power back to the
states.6 ° The opponents of the Constitution did, however, win some
concessions from Federalists. Although an amendment restricting
federal control over the militia was rejected, the adoption of the
Second Amendment was understood, at least by some, to provide
some protection for the state militias.61
Tucker's discussion of the radical potential of the militia must be
situated in the context of the debate between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists that led to the publication of Madison's analysis in
Federalist No. 46.62 The inclusion of an explicit provision on the
right to bear arms was designed to prevent the disarmament of
the state militias.6" Tucker realized that this might include a
right to take up arms against the government, a right that might be
exercised as the final check on tyranny.'
Rather than seeking a single monolithic meaning for the right to
bear arms in the Founding Era, it would be more historically
accurate to acknowledge that a number of different interpretations
of the Second Amendment coexisted at the time that it was proposed
and adopted. 5 There was a spectrum of sentiment on each side of
59. See generally Finkelman, supra note 3.
60. Id. at 196-97.
61. See id. at 214; Rakove, supra note 3, at 145-46.
62. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
63. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 56, at 332-36 (discussing the
ability of state governments to prevent "encroachment" by the federal government,
particularly with reference to the military).
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
65. This theory may be called "original meaning" originalism. See Randy E. Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620-21, 635 (1999) ("[Tjhere are simply
too many parties [to the Constitution] ever to find unanimous agreement to an idiosyncratic
meaning."); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers'Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 403, 410 (1996); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996). For a more complex and
intellectually rigorous version of originalism, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). For
critiques of Second Amendment originalism, see Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The
Second Amendment and the Failure of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 167 (2000), and
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the ratification struggle. Many leading Anti-Federalists dismissed
the Bill of Rights as little more than "a tub to the whale," a distrac-
tion offering little of substance.' For these Anti-Federalists, the
right to bear arms was a hollow promise. Other more moderate
Anti-Federalists viewed the inclusion of an explicit provision on the
right to bear arms as a modest victory for the cause of states' rights.
For these Anti-Federalists, the inclusion of the Second Amendment
reduced, but did not eliminate, the danger of federal disarmament
of the state militias. 7 Leading Federalists were at least as cynical
as elite Anti-Federalists, viewing the Bill of Rights as something
that was at best "a parchment barrier," and at worst a legal error
that would actually weaken liberty, not strengthen it.' Federalist
Fisher Ames captured this latter view when he mocked the demand
for an explicit provision affirming the right to bear arms, viewing
such requests as the height of folly.69 Other Federalists, including
Madison, were less dismissive and accepted that a statement of
basic rights, including the right to bear arms, might assuage
moderate Anti-Federalists and help bring the nation together.7 °
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN TUCKER'S VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION
To understand the differences between his earliest discussion
of the Second Amendment in his unpublished law lectures and
the analysis that appeared in print a decade later, one must
acknowledge the impact of the tumultuous events of the 1790s on
Tucker's thinking. The Federalist Era, the contentious period
between the adoption of the Constitution and Jefferson's election to
Rakove, supra note 3.
66. Finkelman, supra note 3, at 215 & n.95.
67. Saul Cornell, Beyond the Myth of Consensus, in BEYOND THE FOUNDERS: NEW
APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 256, 257-58 (Jeffrey L.
Pasley et al. eds., 2004).
68. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 301.
69. Rakove, supra note 3.
70. On the ideological diversity of the Founding Era, see generally Isaac Kramnick, The
"Great National Discussion" The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1988)
(contrasting Federalist and Anti-Federalist viewpoints).
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the presidency in 1800, was a period of bitter conflict between
Republicans and Federalists.7 1 Tucker became a vocal spokesman
for Jeffersonianism and an outspoken critic of Federalist constitu-
tional theory.72 His discussion of the Second Amendment was one
small part of his effort to formulate an alternative theory of the
Constitution to counter the nationalist vision of the Federalists.
When properly understood within the historical context of the
acrimonious debates over the Constitution in the first decade after
its ratification, Tucker's fascinating discussions of the right to
bear arms not only underscore how important this issue was to
Americans in this era, but also show how closely connected this
problem was to other contentious questions in early American law,
such as federalism and judicial review. A serious historical examina-
tion of Tucker's views on the meaning of the Second Amendment
serves as a useful reminder that constitutional ideas were in flux in
this formative period. Moreover, Tucker's attack on Federalist
theories of the Second Amendment provides further evidence that
conflict, not consensus, defined constitutional debate at this pivotal
moment in American history.
Tucker's Commentaries are best understood as providing one
important gloss on the meaning of American constitutionalism at
the end of the Federalist Era. Tucker's writings reflected a distinctly
Jeffersonian point of view, one grounded in the theory of states'
rights.7" One cannot understand Tucker's Commentaries without
appreciating that his multivolume treatise was the culmination of
more than a decade of lecturing, writing, and protesting against the
Federalist agenda.7 4
71. On the 1790s, see generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRCK, THE AGE OF
FEDERALISM (1993), and JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST
DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999).
72. See Robert Morton Scott, St. George Tucker and the Development ofAmerican Culture
in Early Federal Virginia, 1790-1824, at 103-04, 124-26 (Feb. 17, 1991) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, George Washington University) (on file with Rockefeller Library, Colonial
Williamsburg) (discussing the publishing history of Tucker's edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries).
73. See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV.
331, 397 n.317 (2004).
74. The footnotes to this essay were littered with citations to the texts that had defined
opposition constitutional thought during that tempestuous era. Tucker not only cited
Madison's Report of 1800, he quoted approvingly from more than a dozen Democratic-
Republican pamphlets, essays, and speeches published in the late 1790s. On the development
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Tucker set out to do more than merely refute Federalist constitu-
tional heresies; he sought to extirpate the outmoded English legal
doctrines that lay at the root of those theories. One of the chief
sources for these ideas was the English legal treatises Americans
used as the basis for their legal education. Among these works, no
treatise was more influential than Blackstone's. Purging American
law of its antirepublican English remnants was a monumental
project. The American Revolution, Tucker believed, had "given
birth" to a new era in human history and inaugurated a "new
epoch" in the annals of law.75 In formulating his constitutional
theory, Tucker drew heavily on Madison's Report of 1800, the final
summation of Virginia's response to the Alien and Sedition Crisis.7"
The learned Virginian judge shared Madison's belief that the states
were the indispensable guardians of American liberty." On this
point, the Republican opposition was in complete accord. Tucker
shared with Madison and Jefferson a firm belief that the rights of
the states and the rights of individuals were inescapably bound
together in American constitutional theory. By safeguarding the
latter, one protected the former.78
The subject of bearing arms afforded Tucker an excellent focal
point to consider the profound gulf separating the way supporters
of Jefferson and their Federalist opponents viewed the Constitution.
Tucker used his discussion of the Second Amendment as a means of
exposing the flaws in Federalist constitutional theory and affirming
the superiority of his own brand of Jeffersonian constitutionalism.79
Constitutional interpretation was at the core of this disagree-
ment. Republicans favored a philosophy of strict construction,
believing that the preservation of liberty and a republican form
of government required that one approach the language of the
of this dissenting tradition, see generally CORNELL, supra note 26, which provides a detailed
account of Anti-Federalist politics, history, and thought.
75. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 104, 122.
76. H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of '98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L.
REV. 689, 713-14 (1994).
77. Lash, supra note 73, at 398.
78. For an elaboration of this insight, see id. at 394-95.
79. For a general discussion of the lack of political consensus in this era, see generally
Kramnick, supra note 70. On the conflict between Federalists and Jeffersonians on the
meaning of the First Amendment, see NORMAN ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 82-99 (1986).
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Constitution in an almost literal fashion.8 ° Federalists supported
Hamilton's theory of loose construction, which gave Congress
considerable latitude to accomplish its designated legislative
functions.81 Tucker shared with other Jeffersonians a deep-seated
antipathy toward this theory of the Constitution. Given the chasm
separating Federalists from their Jeffersonian opponents on
virtually every major constitutional question of the day, it is hardly
surprising that they would interpret the Second Amendment in
radically different terms.82
Tucker's first discussion of the Second Amendment does not
occur in the often-quoted passage describing it as the "palladium
of liberty,"83 but rather in the midst of an attack on Federalist
efforts to use volunteer militias during the "Quasi-War" with France
(1797-1800).8 Tucker and other Republicans viewed this policy as
a perfect example of how Federalists were willing to stretch the
meaning of the Constitution to accomplish their goals.85 Although
the Constitution did not explicitly prohibit a volunteer militia,
Federalists had assured their opponents in 1788 that a citizens'
militia officered by the states would provide a bulwark against
potential federal tyranny. 6 Ten years later in 1798, it appeared that
Federalists were attempting to subvert this ideal by an "unconstitu-
tional act of congress.87 In place of a militia drawn from the ranks
of all citizens, Federalists sought a select militia drawn from a small
elite. For Tucker and other Jeffersonians, a select militia would
80. J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 917 n.35 (1988) (book review).
81. Id. at 917 n.35, 923.
82. On the differences between the two approaches to constitutional interpretation, see
generally LYNCH, supra note 71.
83. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 300.
84. ELKINS & McKITRIC, supra note 71.
85. See CORNELL, supra note 26, at 272 (referring to the Alien and Sedition Acts as
examples of shaping the Constitution beyond its intended meaning).
86. To support this assertion, Tucker cited Madison's Report of 1800, which provides
further evidence that his thinking about the meaning of the right to bear arms in his
published study was formulated at the end of the 1790s. Tucker, View of the Constitution,
supra note 1, ed. app. at 297 n.*.
87. Id. ed. app. at 275. On Tucker's connection to dissenting constitutional theory, see
CORNELL, supra note 26, at 272.
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easily become a tool of a party or faction and would pose a threat to
liberty.'
This discussion of the Second Amendment clearly frames the
issue in terms of the militia. He reiterated his earlier view that
the adoption of the Second Amendment was a response to Anti-
Federalist concerns about the future of the state militias. Tucker
went so far as to argue that adoption of the Second Amendment had
dispelled "all room for doubt, or uneasiness upon the subject." 9
Later, in his View of the Constitution, Tucker included an entirely
new discussion of the Second Amendment that used the right to
bear arms as a means to discuss the scope of judicial review under
the Constitution.' This new analysis was framed in response to the
Alien and Sedition crisis.9" The hypothetical scenario Tucker
conjured up was federal disarmament of the militia.92 The issue that
concerned Tucker was how to respond when "the legislature should
pass a law dangerous to the liberties of the people."9" In Tucker's
view, "[t]he judiciary, therefore, is that department of the govern-
ment to whom the protection of the rights of the individual is by the
constitution especially confided, interposing its shield between him
and the sword of usurped authority."94 Congressional disarmament
provided an excellent illustration of this point: "If, for example,
congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person from bearing
arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial courts,
under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here
contended for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the
constitutionality of these means."95 The underlying constitutional
theory that made such developments possible was the Federalist
theory of loose construction of the Constitution. "[I]f congress
may use any means, which [it] choose [s] to adopt" to achieve its goal
of preventing insurrections, Tucker complained, it could easily
88. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 274-75.
89. Id. ed. app. at 273.
90. Barnett, supra note 2, at 246; Kopel, supra note 2, at 1378.
91. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 357.
92. Id. ed. app. at 289.
93. Id. ed. app. at 357.
94. Id.
95. Id. ed. app. at 289.
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transform "the provision in the constitution which secures to the
people the right of bearing arms" into "a mere nullity."'6
The modern individual rights misreading of Tucker stems in part
from the failure to note the influence of the Alien and Sedition crisis
in shaping his mature constitutional theory. Tucker's response to
this crisis led him to extend and refine his analysis of the role that
the Second Amendment might play in American constitutionalism.
The danger that Tucker apprehended was federal disarmament
of the state militias. Tucker appended a civic conception of arms
bearing to his earlier states' rights conception of the Second
Amendment. 7
Jeffersonian outrage was not directed at the prospect that
Federalists would pass laws that hindered individuals from
defending themselves against intruders and housebreakers. The
target of disarmament was muskets and rifles, not sword canes or
pistols, or other weapons with limited military value intended
primarily for self-protection. There was little reason to fear
Federalists targeting such weapons and considerable cause for
alarm about the right to keep and bear arms in the militia.
Federalists in Virginia had hinted at the prospect of disarmament
as a means of preventing insurrection during the crisis provoked by
the Alien and Sedition Acts.98 Disarming the state militias by
preventing citizens from keeping and bearing arms was exactly the
kind of policy that Tucker and other Jeffersonians would have
feared most.99 Thwarting Federalist tyranny required a well-
regulated militia controlled by the individual states. If Federalists
96. Id.
97. Tucker's interpretation of the Second Amendment as a right of citizens to bear arms
as part of a well-regulated militia fits with the new paradigm for the Second Amendment that
has emerged in the scholarly literature. For efforts to reformulate Second Amendment theory
along these lines, see Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 LAW &
HIST. REV. 161, 165-66 (2004), and David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing
Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of "the Right of the People to Keep and Bear
Arms," 22 LAW & HisT. REv. 119, 153, 158 (2004). But see H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G.
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL
SILENT 166 (2002). See generally id. at 147-211 (discussing how one should analyze and
interpret the Constitution); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and
Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 613-21 (2000) (discussing ideas of individual
rights revisionists and their weaknesses).
98. See The Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature 11 (1798).
99. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 300.
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tried to restrict the right to bear arms in the militia, Tucker
believed that federal courts should strike down such laws as
unconstitutional."° Protection of this civic right was essential for
the Second Amendment to function as a guardian of the rights of the
states. In his mature writings, the civic and states' rights function
of the Amendment were closely connected.
III.TucKER AND THE LOST LANGUAGE OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
Tucker's discussion of judicial review focused on potential federal
threats to the right to bear arms.'0 ' The term "bear arms" has itself
become a hotly contested issue in modern Second Amendment
debate. For many modern gun rights advocates the term "bear
arms" is interchangeable with the phrase "bear a gun."' 2 There is
little historical evidence to support such a claim.'0 ' Although a few
isolated texts use such idiosyncratic language, the dominant
understanding of this phrase, and the accepted legal usage,
described the use of weapons in a military context. °4 One of the
most serious problems with individual rights theory is that it makes
it impossible to understand why some states embraced a new
formulation of the right to bear arms in the nineteenth century.
Rather than assert a right to "bear arms for the defense of them-
selves and the state," the new Jacksonian constitutional formulation
100. See id. ed. app. at 289.
101. Id.
102. Barnett, supra note 2, at 244-45; Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment
Jurisprudence: Firearms, Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 157, 162-63 (1999) (positing that a federal law criminalizing gun possession by
individuals under a domestic violence restraining order violates the Second Amendment).
103. For an illustration of the problems with Barnett's method, which is both
impressionistic and anachronistic, compare his discussion of the meaning of the term "bear
arms," supra note 2, at 243-64 (arguing that the right to bear arms did apply to nonmilitary
contexts), with Michael Dorfs discussion, Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment
Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 291, 293-94 (2000) (favoring a collective right to bear
arms over an individual right). Dorf provides dozens of examples of the term "bear arms"
being used in a military sense, Dorf, supra, at 306-14, while Barnett relies primarily on an
idiosyncratic text such as the Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority, Barnett, supra note 2, at
246-60. While one can find isolated examples of this usage, the legal meaning of the term was
well understood to be military.
104. See Yassky, supra note 97, at 617; see also Barnett, supra note 2, at 260 (admitting
that Congress used the phrase "bear arms" only for military contexts between 1774 and 1821).
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of this right asserted that "each person has a right to bear arms in
defense of himself and the State."' 5 Indeed, the shift in language
between the Founding Era and the Jacksonian period itself provides
one of the best arguments against reading the earlier language as
advancing an individual right. There would have been little need to
adopt the new formulation if the old one were widely understood to
protect an individual right.10 6
The only time that bearing a gun might be equated with bearing
arms was when a weapon was carried in the context of militia
service. Perhaps the best illustration of this distinction is a draft
law written by Thomas Jefferson and proposed by James Madison
to punish those who had violated Virginia's game laws.0 7 The
statute penalized any individual who "bear[s] a gun out of his
inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty."1'0 The
purpose of the statute was to distinguish between the different
levels of regulation appropriate to nonmilitary use of firearms and
use of firearms within the context of militia duty.'0 9 When read in
context, this text undermines the claims of individual rights
theorists. Indeed, the individual-rights interpretation of this
passage is almost exactly opposite of the meaning intended by
Madison."'
105. Cornell, supra note 3, at 676-77.
106. On the emergence of a new formulation of the right to bear arms in the Jacksonian
era, see Cornell, supra note 3, at 678-79, and Robert Weisberg, The Utilitarian and
Deontological Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 71 U. CHI.
L. REv. 333, 341-43 (2004) (book review).
107. See Ronald S. Resnick, Private Arms as the Palladium of Liberty: The Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1, 26 (1999).
108. A Bill for Preservation of Deer (1785), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 444
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
109. Madison presented the bill to the House but no action was taken. Id. at 444. Virginia
had enacted two earlier game laws in 1738 and 1772. Id. (citing 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE;
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 60-63 (William Waller Hening ed., photo.
reprint 1969) (1819); 8 id. at 591-94).
110. For misreadings of this text by modern gun rights advocates, see supra note 3. For a
more elaborate discussion of the robust character of early American gun regulation, including
disarmament of segments of the population deemed dangerous, see Cornell & DeDino, supra
note 14, at 505-06. See also Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to James Jay Baker,
Executive Dir., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n (May 17, 2001), available at httpJ/www.nraila.org/images/
Ashcroft.pdf (finding disarming equivalent to enslaving). On the Ashcroft letter, see generally
Mathew S. Nosanchuk, The Embarrassing Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY.
L. REv. 705 (2002). On the Department of Justice's memo supporting the Ashcroft letter, see
Jess Bravin, Bush Lawyers Target Gun Control's Legal Rationale, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2005,
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Tucker's use of the term "bear arms" reflected the dominant
understanding of his day, which clearly distinguished between
bearing arms and bearing a gun. This difference emerged clearly in
Tucker's treatment of the rights of African Americans. Tucker
discussed the legal status of "free negroes and mulattoes,""' who
had been legally prohibited from "serving in the militia, except as
drummers or pioneers." This prohibition had been lifted and Tucker
noted that free blacks were later "enrolled in the lists of those that
bear arms."112 Tucker's discussion of the ambiguous status of free
blacks provides additional evidence that the term "bear arms" was
a legal term of art that clearly implied the use of arms in a public
capacity, not a private one. Indeed, he noted that under state law
"[a]ll but house-keepers, and persons residing upon the frontiers are
prohibited from keeping or carrying any gun, powder, shot, club, or
other weapon offensive or defensive."'' Once again, Tucker's usage
merits closer scrutiny. Tucker did not describe the nonmilitary use
of weapons by blacks on the frontier as bearing arms, he described
such an activity as carrying a gun.' There was an important legal
difference between bearing a gun and bearing arms. In his own
proposal for emancipation, Tucker recommended prohibiting any
"negroe or mulattoe" from "keeping, or bearing arms.""' According
to Tucker's analysis, blacks would be prohibited from keeping arms
in their home, or from appearing at muster and being issued arms
they might bear as part of the militia. Modern individual rights
theorists have asserted that the phrase "keep and bear arms" was
not a single unified principle, but two separate ideas. The only
example of these two ideas being severable is the anomalous
situation of free blacks described by Tucker. Indeed, no constitu-
tional text from the Founding Era, including the Second Amend-
ment, used the "keep or bear" formulation that Tucker employed to
describe the unique situation faced by free blacks in Virginia. The
at A4.
111. St. George Tucker, A Dissertation on Slavery: With a Proposal for the Gradual
Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia (1796), in ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 409 (Clyde N. Wilson ed.,
1999) [hereinafter Tucker, Dissertation on Slavery].
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 441.
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Second Amendment affirmed a right to keep and bear arms, not a
right to keep and carry firearms, or a right to keep and/or bear
arms.
116
Much of the modern confusion over the Second Amendment stems
from the simple individual/collective rights dichotomy that has
shaped modern discussions of the right to bear arms. 117 Rather than
fit Tucker's thought into the modern dichotomous debate over the
right to bear arms, it would make more historical sense to look at
how Tucker conceptualized the nature of rights. Tucker's theory of
rights included a typology with four distinct legal categories:
natural, social, civil, and political. In this elaborate scheme, the
right of individual self-defense, the right of greatest concern to
modern gun rights advocates, was cast as a natural right, one that
had been substantially narrowed when one left the state of nature
and entered civil society. The Second Amendment, by contrast, fit
into Tucker's third and fourth categories, civil rights and political
rights. Tucker's term "civil right" might best be rendered in modern
parlance as a civic right, a right that "appertain[s] to a man as a
citizen or subject.""' Tucker understood these rights to provide a
means of safeguarding other rights, and hence Tucker appropriately
described the right to bear arms as "the true palladium of liberty.""'
Not every individual was entitled to the full rights of citizenship.
Among those excluded from such rights were "aliens, women,
children under the age of discretion, idiots, and lunatics, during
their state of insanity, and negroes and mulattoes, though natives
of the state, and born free."'2 ° These excluded categories were also
groups that did not bear arms.'2 ' Finally, the role of the Second
Amendment as a check on federal power fit Tucker's notion of a
political right, a right enjoyed by groups acting in a political
116. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
117. Compare Jesse Matthew Ruhl et al., Gun Control: Targeting Rationality in a Loaded
Debate, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 413, 426 (2004) (asserting that Tucker believed that the
Second Amendment provided an individual right), with Koren Wai Wong-Ervin, Note, The
Second Amendment and the Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a Workable Jurisprudence,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 177, 188 (1998) (asserting that Tucker believed that the Second Amendment
provided both an individual and a collective right).
118. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 300.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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capacity, including the states. Efforts to prevent individual citizens
from bearing arms in the militia would have been a violation of a
civil right in Tucker's scheme, and efforts to block the states from
using their militias would have been a violation of a political right.
Thus, Tucker's understanding of the right to bear arms included
aspects that would fit both the modern collective and civic rights
models. The right at the core of modern gun rights ideology, the
right of personal self-defense, had little to do with the Second
Amendment, but it was part of the common law tradition, a subject
of considerable interest to Tucker and one that has been much
neglected in modern discussions of guns and the law.
IV. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
Although the modern debate over guns has focused largely on
questions of constitutional law, in Tucker's day the use of firearms
outside of the context of militia service was primarily an issue of
statutory and common law. The fact that personal self-defense was
a subject best understood in terms of common law rather than
constitutional law did not mean that Tucker viewed it as somehow
less important. The bulk of Tucker's five-volume treatise, it is worth
recalling, was not a study of constitutional law, but common law. 122
Although the constitutional right to bear arms and the common
law right to bear a gun in self-defense have become blurred together
in many modern discussions about the right to bear arms, the two
concepts were legally distinct in the Founding Era. A few efforts had
been made to incorporate this common law principle into state bills
of rights during the Founding Era, but those efforts inevitably
failed. Thus, Jefferson's proposal for the Virginia Declaration of
Rights that "no freeman be debarred the use of arms" was ulti-
mately not included in that text. 1 23 Most Americans simply did not
see the need to single out the common law right of self-defense for
inclusion in any constitutional document. This decision did not
mean that Americans did not value this right, nor did it mean that
they believed they had forfeited it. The protection of this right, a
122. Id. passim.
123. See Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Constitution, First Draft (1776), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 108, at 329, 344.
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protection well established under common law, was left to courts
and juries, the traditional guardians of such rights.124
The common law not only sanctioned the right of self-defense but
also established a host of restraints on the use of firearms, including
crimes such as affray.125 The right to keep or carry firearms outside
of the context of the militia had evolved under common law, the
body of cases that English courts had adjudicated over the course of
several centuries and that contained the bulk of English legal
doctrine. In Tucker's view, the common law had evolved uniquely in
each of the states, and this would have meant that the scope of this
right and the nature of the legal restraints on firearms use would
have varied from one state to another. 126
Tucker's analysis of the distinction between collective self-defense
and individual self-defense emerges clearly in the annotations he
compiled to Blackstone's Commentaries. The right to bear arms
corresponded to what Blackstone described as the fifth auxiliary
right,127 a principle embodied in the English Bill of Rights assertion:
"That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their
Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law.' 28
124. The common law protected many rights. See generally JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 197-201 (4th ed. 2002) (supplying information on
the development of the common law system in England); DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE
OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGALTHEORYIN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 122-25 (1989)
(providing readings on common law principle and precedent in the eighteenth century); JAMES
OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 12-76 (2004) (providing an
exhaustive discussion on the common law Court of King's Bench in the time of Lord
Mansfield); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 14
(abr. ed. 1995) (noting that most eighteenth-century jurists believed that natural rights were
embodied in the common law).
125. See WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 18-20 (Richmond Aug:
Davis 1799) (providing an in-depth discussion of the crime of affray).
126. On the importance of statutory regulation and common law constraints on firearms
in the Founding Era, see Cornell & DeDino, supra note 14, and St. George Tucker, Of the
Cognizance of Crimes and Misdemeanours, in 5 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES
OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, supra note 1, ed. app. at 8-9
[hereinafter Tucker, Crimes and Misdemeanours]
127. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OFVIRGINIA, supra note 1, at 143-44 [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES].
128. The Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., 2d sess., c.2 (Eng.), reprinted in W.C. COSTIN &
J. STEVEN WATSON, THE LAW AND WORKING OF THE CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS 1660-1914,
at 69 (2d ed. 1964).
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Auxiliary rights such as this one were a set of "barriers" within the
British constitutional system that functioned as safeguards against
tyranny.'29 In his explanation of the nature and function of these
auxiliary rights, Blackstone made clear that these checks served a
public political function; they were not a means for citizens to settle
private grievances. 3 ' The fifth auxiliary right, "the right to have
arms," was aimed at preventing the violence of oppression, not
defending oneself against thieves.' To underscore this fact,
Blackstone treated the fifth auxiliary right alongside other political
rights such as the right to petition the government.
3 2
In his gloss on Blackstone's discussion of the fifth auxiliary right,
the right of subjects to have arms for their defense suitable to their
condition as allowed by law, Tucker included a brief footnote in
which he compared the limited nature of this English right with the
more robust right explicitly protected by the Second Amendment,
which contained no restrictions based on social class. 33 The notes
for this section do not address the question of individual self-
defense. A discussion of that issue was reserved for another section
of his treatise that dealt with justifiable homicide." In that
discussion, Tucker makes no mention of the Second Amendment or
the fifth auxiliary right, but instead directed his readers to some of
the better-known English treatises on the common law of crime.
Blackstone's separate discussion of these two rights clearly demon-
strates that the two were legally distinct. Tucker's own discussion
echoed the distinctions between these two rights evidenced in
Blackstone's Commentaries.
31
129. 2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 127, at 140-41.
130. Id. at 143-44.
131. Id. at 143.
132. Id. at 142-45.
133. Id. at 143 ed. n.40.
134. 5 id. at 177-81.
135. 5 id. at 183-84. For problematic modern readings of Blackstone, see generally JOYCE
LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 130
(1994), and Robert Cottrol & Raymond Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995
(1995) (reviewing MALCOLM, supra). For a more plausible historical reading of Blackstone's
views on this matter, see generally Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second
Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 237, 252-60 (2000). Some of the common law treatises
Blackstone cited were MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION
FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY AND OF OTHER
CROWN CASES: TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF THE CROWN LAW
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The difference between the common law right to keep or carry
firearms and the constitutional right to bear arms also emerged in
Tucker's analysis of the law of treason.13 6 This subject presented
Tucker with an excellent opportunity to chastise Federalist judges
who had participated in the trials of the Whiskey and Fries rebels,
two of the most important examples of political unrest in the
1790s.1 7 Federalists in Congress tried to extend federal powers
beyond those designated by the Constitution; so too, Federalist
judges sought to expand the definition of treason beyond the limits
set by the Constitution."13 This loose and expansive construction of
treason employed by Federalists was drawn from English law and
was, therefore, a poor guide for judging Americans who lived under
an entirely different legal and constitutional system.139 The
Federalist approach to treason illustrated the larger problem with
American uses of Blackstone and other English commentators.
Thus, Tucker's critique of the way Federalist judges had handled
this issue allowed him to reiterate the fundamental point of his
treatise: the evolution of American law beyond the limits of English
common law. 4 °
One of the most notable differences between England and
America, in Tucker's view' lay in the radically different views of
guns that had evolved under common law in each society. Tucker
contrasted the American attitude toward gun ownership with the
extremely limited views embedded in English law.' Tucker noted
that under English common law "the bare circumstance of having
arms, therefore, of itself, creates a presumption of warlike force in
England."'4 Such an assumption was entirely unwarranted in many
parts of America. Tucker acknowledged that there was no single
(1762), and WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716).
136. See St. George Tucker, Concerning Treason, in 5 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 127, ed. app. at 19-21 [hereinafter Tucker, Concerning Treason].
137. See id. ed. app. at 24-26.
138. See id. ed. app. at 20-21.
139. For some of Tucker's thoughts on Federalist rulings in treason cases and on the
development of treason in general, see Tucker, Concerning Treason, supra note 136, ed. app.
at 21-40, which states clearly his misgivings about the reasoning of the Whiskey and Fries
cases, especially Justice Samuel Chase's opinion on the constitutional meaning of treason.
140. See Tucker, Crimes and Misdemeanours, supra note 126, ed. app. at 4-10.
141. See Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 1, ed. app. at 300.
142. Tucker, Concerning Treason, supra note 136, ed. app. at 19.
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common law understanding of the right to keep or carry arms in
America. 143 The common law in America had evolved differently in
each state. The common law had to adjust to the fact that citizens
were expected to outfit themselves with weapons suitable for militia
service and train with them.14 Although still subject to reasonable
regulation by statute, the practice of bearing military arms openly
did not by itself create an assumption of either warlike force or
constitute an affray. 45 Americans traveled to muster and practiced
with firearms as part of their obligations to serve in a citizen-
militia. In Tucker's view, the realities of American life had changed
the legal threshold necessary to demonstrate that traveling armed
might constitute an affray, riot, or even treason.146 The law recog-
nized a difference between those weapons suitable for militia service
and others that were only useful for individual self-defense. 47 The
only weapons that enjoyed full constitutional protection were militia
weapons. 4" Yet even the right to travel armed with muskets or
rifles was not unlimited. The fate of the participants in the Whiskey
and Fries rebellions demonstrated this point. 49 The defense and
prosecution in the resulting cases conceded that traveling armed
with militia weapons did not enjoy constitutional protection when
those weapons were used outside of the context of militia-related
activity. 5 ' The defense accepted that an armed assembly might
legitimately be prosecuted for riot, while noting that their client's
actions fell short of the constitutional threshold needed to sustain
a charge of treason. 1 ' In Tucker's view, the defense's concession
that the rebels were engaged in riotous behavior might have been
reasonable in Pennsylvania, but he doubted that such a concession
would have been warranted had the cases been tried in Virginia,
where the mere fact of traveling armed with a musket did not by
143. See Tucker, Crimes and Misdemeanours, supra note 126, ed. app. at 8-9.
144. See, e.g., 1778 N.Y. Laws 62.
145. See Tucker, Concerning Treason, supra note 136, ed. app. at 19.
146. See id. ed. app. at 19-21.
147. See Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158-59 (1840).
148. See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 14, at 500-01.
149. See United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799); United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 348 (1795); United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (1795).
150. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515; Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348; Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346.
151. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515; Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348; Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346.
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itself create any presumption of illegality.'5 2 To sustain a charge of
either riot or affray in his home state of Virginia, he believed, would
require a much higher standard of proof that a group of armed
citizens were engaged in criminal behavior.5 3 The key to deciding
if arming oneself constituted an affray was determined by context.
The law prohibited traveling armed "in terror of the country," but
there were clearly many circumstances in which one might travel
armed without causing an affray. 154
Given his negative comments on the proceedings in all the
Whiskey and Fries Rebellion cases,155 one might reasonably ask if
Tucker believed that there was some kind of constitutional penum-
bra that surrounded the right to bear arms that protected nonmili-
tary use of certain classes of firearms. Applying a modern concept
such as a constitutional penumbra does pose the risk of introducing
an anachronism into discussions of an eighteenth-century constitu-
tional idea. It might be more accurate to consider if the exercise of
this right carried with it any ancillary protection for firearms use.
The scope of any constitutional protection would have been shaped
by the purpose of the right, the maintenance of a well-regulated
militia. Weapons intended primarily for self-defense with little
utility for military engagement would not have enjoyed constitu-
tional protection but would have enjoyed some limited protection
under common law, subject to state regulation. Secondly, traveling
armed, even with militia weapons, would have still been subject to
reasonable regulations and some types of common law constraints.
Attending muster with arms would have enjoyed robust constitu-
tional protection. Carrying a rifle or musket in the streets of
Philadelphia might not have enjoyed the same level of protection.
Rather than think in terms of constitutional penumbras, it would be
more accurate to acknowledge that the exercise of the right to keep
and bear arms necessarily created a subsidiary right to train with
one's weapon. 5 '
152. See generally Tucker, Concerning Treason, supra note 136, ed. app. at 19-21.
153. See generally id. at 22.
154. 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 127, at 146; see also HENING,
supra note 125, at 18-20 (discussing the crime of affray).
155. See Tucker, Concerning Treason, supra note 136, ed. app. at 19-21.
156. See, e.g., 1778 N.Y. Laws 62 (an early New York law requiring militiamen to train
regularly). For modern discussions on the right to train with a weapon, see James A.
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A clear statement of how the right to bear arms created such a
subsidiary right was articulated by one of Tucker's contemporaries,
Samuel Latham Mitchill, in an oration delivered before the Society
of Black Friars in 1793. '"The Establishment of a Militia, in which
most able bodied and middle aged men are enrolled and furnished
with arms, proceeds upon the principle, that they who are able to
govern, are also capable of defending themselves."' It followed
logically from this principle that "the keeping of arms, is, therefore,
not only not prohibited, but is positively provided for by law. 158
Bearing arms, Mitchill noted, was as much a claim by government
on the property and lives of its citizens as it was a claim by them
against their government. 159 To achieve the goal of having a well-
regulated militia meant that government would encourage citizens
to acquire certain types of firearms and attain a basic competency
with them."6 Government might even compel citizens to outfit
themselves and train with such weapons. In America, Mitchill
opined, arms "shall not rust for want of employ, but shall be brought
into use from time to time, that the owner may grow expert in the
handling of them.'' Mitchill did not equate the right to bear arms
with a right of individual self-defense, but he did state a point that
would have seemed obvious to Americans of his day. The fact that
Americans were well armed did yield a security dividend to society.
Arms kept for the purpose of participating in the militia might also
"serve for the defence of the life and property of the individual
against the violent or burglarious attacks of thieves."'62 Another
benefit of a well-regulated militia properly armed and trained was
its efficacy as a means to "suppress any mob or insurrection."'63
Henretta, Collective Responsibilities, Private Arms, and State Regulation: Toward the Original
Understanding, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 534-36 (2004) and Shalhope, supra note 3, at 278-
79.
157. SAMUELLATHAM MITCHILL, AN ORATION, PRONOUNCED BEFORETHE SOCIETY OF BLACK
FRIARS, AT THEIR ANNIVERSARY FESTIVAL, IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ON MONDAY, THE 11TH
OF NOVEMBER, 1793, at 27 (New York, Friar McLean 1793).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 27-28.
160. Id. at 28.
161. Id. at 27.
162. Id. at 28.
163. Id.
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Mitchill's elaboration of the benefits of a well-regulated militia
and the right to keep and bear arms provides an important context
for Tucker's own musings on the scope of this right. In contrast to
English law, which had disarmed the population, American law
encouraged gun ownership so that citizens might meet their
obligation to participate in the militia. Citizens were expected to
participate in a well-regulated militia, which meant not only that
the government would encourage private ownership of firearms, but
the common law, at least in parts of America, had to evolve to deal
with this reality.
Arms owned for militia service were heavily regulated, but these
arms also enjoyed a privileged legal status and were constitutionally
protected."M Civilian firearms did not enjoy this type of protection
and were subject to even more robust legislative control."16 The legal
difference between constitutionally protected arms and ordinary
guns was captured by an anonymous author in a Maine newspaper
as he pondered the meaning of the arms bearing provision of the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.166 In his view, "the legislature
have [sic] a power to controul [arms] in all cases, except the one
mentioned in the bill of rights, whenever they shall think the good
of the whole require it. '16 7 Personal arms such as pistols were not
treated in the same way as militia weapons such as muskets. In the
absence of any law prohibiting the ownership or use of personal
firearms, "the people still enjoy, and must continue so to do till the
legislature shall think fit to interdict."1" When the legislature acted,
however, the right to keep or carry these types of weapons could be
severely constrained. The scope of legislative authority over such
firearms was broad, but not unlimited. Laws enacted to regulate
164. See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 14, at 500-01.
165. See Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 90 (prohibiting the sale and possession of
dangerous weapons, including Bowie knives and pistols); see also Act of Feb. 24, 1797, 1797
N.J. Laws 179 (punishing armed rioters); 1785 N.Y. Laws 152 (restricting the discharge of
firearms on certain days of the year).
166. See Scribble-Scrabble, Letter to the Editor, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.),
Jan. 26, 1787, at 1 [hereinafter Scribble-Scrabble, January 1787 Letter to the Editor]; see also
Scribble-Scrabble, Letter to the Editor, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Dec. 8, 1786,
at 1 [hereinafter Scribble-Scrabble, December 1786 Letter to the Editor].
167. Scribble-Scrabble, December 1786 Letter to the Editor, supra note 166.
168. Scribble-Scrabble, January 1787 Letter to the Editor, supra note 166 (emphasis
added).
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firearms would still need to be directed at a legitimate public
purpose and had to be reasonable. Within these constraints, the
legislature had considerable latitude to regulate the possession and
the use of guns.
This understanding of the right to bear arms seems entirely
consistent with the evolution of firearms law and jurisprudence at
the state level in the decades following the adoption of the Second
Amendment. In the eighteenth century, states enacted laws
designed to encourage citizens to arm themselves with weapons
suitable for participation in the militia.'69 In the decades after the
adoption of the Second Amendment, the individual states adopted
a variety of laws aimed at discouraging, and in some cases prohibit-
ing, citizens from arming themselves with weapons that had little
connection to the goal of creating a well-regulated militia, such as
pistols. 7 0 When faced with legal challenges to these new gun control
laws, state courts employed a logic similar to the one used by
Tucker, Mitchill, and the pseudonymous writer from Maine who
drew a clear distinction between militia weapons and civilian
arms.17' While militia weapons enjoyed considerable protection,
weapons designed for personal protection, such as Bowie knives and
handguns, were subject to more extensive regulation and might
even be prohibited in some cases. 7 ' The only types of firearms that
enjoyed full constitutional protection were those weapons that
citizens were obligated to own so that they could meet their duty to
participate in the militia.
17
169. See 1778 N.Y. Laws 62 (requiring militiamen to provide various items of equipment
at their own expense, including musket, bayonet, and cartridges). For a general discussion of
various states and their regulation of militia, see Cornell & DeDino, supra note 14, at 508-10.
170. See Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 90 (prohibiting the sale and possession of
dangerous weapons including Bowie knives and pistols); see also Act of Feb. 2, 1838, 1838 Va.
Acts (criminalizing the carrying of concealed weapons). See generally Cornell & DeDino, supra
note 14, at 502-15.
171. SeeAymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158-59 (1840) (concerning the distinction
between militia weapons and civilian arms); see also State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 18 (1842)
(concerning the violation of an Arkansas statute that made the carrying of a pistol a
misdemeanor).
172. See Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 154, 158-59; see also Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga.
Laws 90 (prohibiting the sale of Bowie knives and pistols).
173. See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 14, at 508-10.
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CONCLUSION
Tucker's interpretation of the right to bear arms provided the
learned jurist with an opportunity to explore the meaning of
federalism and states' rights, the proper method for interpreting the
constitution, the continuing relevance of the right of armed
resistance under constitutional government, judicial review, the
nature of citizenship, the complex nature of different types of rights
claims under American constitutional law, and the divergent
evolution of the common law in different parts of America. In his
earliest commentaries on the Second Amendment, Tucker inter-
preted the meaning of this provision of the Bill of Rights within the
context of federalism as a right of the states. He saw the Second
Amendment as a concession to Anti-Federalists designed to limit
the potential disarmament of the militia and check the grant of
authority over the militia in Article I, Section 8. Tucker even
conceded that the states might use this awesome power as the
ultimate check on federal tyranny. By the time Tucker published his
more mature thoughts on the Second Amendment in his Blackstone,
much had changed. Fears that might have seemed slightly far-
fetched in 1788 were no longer "visionary supposition" or "the
incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy."' 4 In response to these
changed circumstances, Tucker refined and expanded his discussion
of the right to bear arms, exploring the civic character of the right
and examining how the federal courts might protect citizens from
federal laws intended to prevent them from exercising their right to
bear arms in a well-regulated militia.
Tucker shared with others in the Founding generation the belief
that bearing arms in the militia was legally distinct from bearing or
carrying a gun in self-defense. The latter right was well established
in common law, while the former had been explicitly protected by
the Second Amendment. The different legal foundations for these
two rights did not diminish his appreciation of the importance of
either. Modern gun rights ideology has conflated these two rights.
Given the trajectory of modern constitutional law, this confusion is
understandable. Tucker lived in a different era, a time when the
protections of common law were a vital part of American law.
174. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 56, at 334.
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Far too much scholarly energy has been wasted in the great
American gun debate trying to twist history to produce a usable
past. While both sides in this debate have played the law office
history game on occasion, partisans of the individual-rights view
have been far more aggressive in pushing their ideological agenda.
Ironically, this revisionist historical project has been carried out
under the banner of constitutional originalism. Reinterpreting the
Second Amendment as an individual right does more than simply
distort history for ideological purposes, it also does great violence to
the text of the Constitution, turning the Bill of Rights into a
constitutional "Etch-a-Sketch" in which the Second Amendment's
preamble, tying the purpose of the Amendment to the preservation
of a well-regulated militia, can be erased by judicial fiat. Such bold
rewriting of the text of the Constitution goes well beyond what the
most ardent proponents of a living constitution would advocate, and
seems wildly inconsistent with the professed commitment to
originalism of most gun rights advocates.
There is no need to distort history to achieve progress in
America's great gun debate. The time has come to abandon the
simplistic dichotomy that dominated discussion of gun control for
most of the last century. Rather than argue endlessly over the
individual or collective rights character of the Second Amendment,
scholars could spend their time more profitably hammering out a
workable firearms jurisprudence. The real issue in the contempo-
rary debate over guns in America has little to do with the fear of
standing armies and the danger of militia disarmament that
inspired the framing of the Second Amendment. The modern debate
over guns in America is about the scope of the right of self-defense.
Framing a jurisprudence that can reconcile the need for public
safety with the rights of gun owners need not involve the Second
Amendment at all. Rather than try to fit the great American gun
debate into the existing framework that has produced our current
impasse, the time has arrived to create a new paradigm to deal with
this contentious issue. Here Tucker's writings about the common
law foundations of the right of self-defense might provide some
useful insights for constitutional theorists trying to find a way to
balance these opposing values. The power of the common law
resided in its ability to evolve organically in response to changing
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circumstances. While Tucker's writings were the product of a
different world, there may still be much we can learn from the
erudite jurist.
